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Note 
An Improved Framework for Analyzing “Substantially 
Similar” Patent Claims with Respect to the Inequitable 
Conduct Defense 
Michael Buschbach∗ 
With its decisions in Dayco Products1 and McKesson,2 the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expanded the scope of 
the materiality leg of the inequitable conduct defense. A patent 
prosecutor’s duty of disclosure, the court found, extends to 
rejections by the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
examiner of “substantially similar” claims in co-pending 
applications. 
This Note addresses criticisms of those Federal Circuit 
cases in the context of the purposes of the inequitable conduct 
defense in order to formulate an improved framework for 
analysis. Part I of this Note traces the development of the 
inequitable conduct defense through Dayco Products and 
McKesson as the Federal Circuit seeks an appropriate standard 
for determining whether information is material and therefore 
subject to disclosure. Part II of this Note analyzes those 
decisions, discusses the difficulties inherent in substantial 
similarity analysis, and considers the importance of prior art in 
patent validity, infringement cases, and inequitable conduct 
charges. This Note concludes that the Federal Circuit should 
incorporate a comparison of the prior art referenced by the 
applications into its substantial similarity framework. 
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∗ Michael Buschbach is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota. He 
would like to thank his adored wife, Heidi, and his beloved daughters, Acacia 
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 1. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 2. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD 
OF MATERIALITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS AND 
FAILURES TO DISCLOSE 
A. PATENTS AS A VOLUNTARY EXCHANGE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT 
The United States Constitution authorizes Congress to 
grant an inventor an exclusive right to the exercise of his 
invention,3 and that body has obliged through passage of the 
Patent Act, which grants patent holders “the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States . . . .”4 This exclusionary power 
is properly characterized as a property right;5 a patent, 
therefore, is a Congressional grant of property. However, only 
“things which add to the sum of useful knowledge” are to be 
granted patents.6 In exchange for the government grant of 
property, the government requires actual innovation and that 
the inventor set forth, via a written description, “the manner 
and process of making and using [the invention, with sufficient 
specificity] . . . as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to 
make and use [it] . . . .”7 The description enters the public 
                                                          
 3. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .” U.S CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1–8. 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000). 
 5. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense 
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest 
is the right to exclude others.”); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) (“The federal patent system thus 
embodies a carefully crafted bargain encouraging the creation and disclosure 
of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for 
the exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.”); Festo Corp. 
v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (“The 
patent laws ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts’ by rewarding 
innovation with a temporary monopoly. The monopoly is a property right . . . .” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 6. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). This important 
limitation, rooted in England’s Statute of Monopolies, prevents Congress from 
granting patents to politically favored groups that provide little or no public 
benefit. See id. at 5–6. 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer 
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The disclosure required by the 
Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’”) (quoting Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 
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domain as a result, and the sum of society’s useful knowledge 
increases. 
B. CREATION OF THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE 
Like any system of voluntary exchange, the patent system 
is subject to misrepresentation, both fraudulent and innocent. 
In contract law, one of the available remedies for 
misrepresentation is rescission, even where fraudulent intent is 
absent or not proved.8 Congress, through successive Patent 
Acts, has provided for the repeal of a patent upon a showing 
that, for example, the patent “was obtained surreptitiously by, 
or upon false suggestion.”9  In addition, federal courts seek to 
ensure that the public as a contractual party with the putative 
inventor receives the benefit for which its government has 
granted exclusive rights.10 One of the most important common 
law developments in this regard was the creation of an 
inequitable conduct defense to patent infringement. 
An owner of a patent relies on the courts to enforce his 
property rights against infringers—those using, making, 
selling, or offering to sell, without authorization, inventions 
covered by his patents.11 In 1945 in Precision Instrument 
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 
the Supreme Court, relying on the equitable doctrine of clean 
hands,12 announced that for the protection of the public: 
                                                          
Pet.) 218, 242 (1832) (referring to patent rights in exchange for innovation as a 
“contract”). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1979) (contract is 
voidable where “a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by either a 
fraudulent or material misrepresentation by the other party”). The test for 
inequitable conduct in contract law is different from that found in patent law 
because it requires either fraudulent intent or a material misrepresentation, 
but not both. 
 9. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 111 (1790); see also Robert J. 
Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 37–38 (1993) (summarizing development of the 
inequitable conduct defense). 
 10. See Scott D. Anderson, Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and 
Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 845, 846–47 (1999) (“[s]ociety at 
large is damaged when it receives a poor bargain.” ). Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that the laws passed by Congress to provide a reward for innovation are 
to be construed so as not to “countenance[e] acts which are fraudulent or may 
prove mischievous.” Grant, 31 U.S. at 242. “The public yields nothing which it 
has not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive.” Id. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
 12. “[H]e who comes into equity must come with clean hands.” Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945). 
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Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who 
are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising 
duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or 
inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. This duty is not 
excused by reasonable doubts as to the sufficiency of the proof of the 
inequitable conduct nor by resort to independent legal advice. Public 
interest demands that all facts relevant to such matters be submitted 
formally or informally to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon 
the sufficiency of the evidence. Only in this way can that agency act to 
safeguard the public in the first instance against fraudulent patent 
monopolies. Only in that way can the Patent Office and the public 
escape from being classed among the “mute and helpless victims of 
deception and fraud.”13 
The respondent in Precision had repeatedly and 
egregiously violated this rule during prosecution of its patents 
at issue.14 As a result, the Court found those patents 
unenforceable against the accused infringer.15 
C. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF MATERIALITY 
1. Striking a Balance to Avoid Overreaching 
Presently, in order “[t]o prove inequitable conduct in the 
prosecution of a patent, [the defendant] must have provided 
evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, 
failure to disclose material information, or submission of false 
material information, coupled with an intent to deceive.”16 The 
analysis is performed in two steps comprising “first, a 
determination of whether the withheld reference meets a 
threshold level of materiality and intent to mislead, and 
second, a weighing of the materiality and intent in light of all 
the circumstances to determine whether the applicant’s 
conduct is so culpable that the patent should be held 
unenforceable.”17 “Both intent and materiality are questions of 
fact that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”18 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 818 (citations omitted). 
 14. Id. at 816–20. 
 15. Id. at 816. 
 16. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 237 F.3d 1359, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc. 149 F.3d 1321, 
1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation omitted). 
 17. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362–63 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Purdue Pharma, 237 F.3d at 1366). 
 18. Id. at 1362–63. If either materiality or intent fails to rise to the 
requisite threshold, a court need not engage in the further analysis of 
balancing the equities. See Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 398 
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Questions of ‘materiality’ and ‘culpability’ are often interrelated and 
intertwined, so that a lesser showing of the materiality of the 
withheld information may suffice when an intentional scheme to 
defraud is established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality 
of withheld information would necessarily create an inference that its 
nondisclosure was ‘wrongful.’19 
But more than just those two factors will be considered. A 
court must weigh materiality and intent in the totality of the 
circumstances to find whether the equities warrant a 
conclusion that inequitable conduct occurred.20 
Since Precision, courts have struggled to establish a test 
for materiality that properly balances the costs and benefits of 
the defense of inequitable conduct. Provide a standard that is 
too lenient, and charges of inequitable conduct are raised 
during infringement hearings as a matter of course.21 A lenient 
standard also makes it more likely that an otherwise valid 
patent will be rendered unenforceable due to innocent mistakes 
during prosecution or to errors during the trial. This fear is 
compounded by the severity of the punishment: a finding of 
inequitable conduct with respect to only one claim during the 
prosecution of a patent application renders the entire patent 
unenforceable.22 Thus, it is possible that claims otherwise 
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 19. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Digital Equipment Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 
716 (1st Cir. 1981)). 
 20. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Aircraft Braking Systems Corp., 72 F.3d 1577, 
1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). A conclusive list of the equities that may affect the 
decision has not been established, but in the B.F. Goodrich case, the Federal 
Circuit accepted the lower court’s determination that the complexity and 
uncertainty of the on-sale bar and obviousness doctrines at the time justified 
giving the patentee “the benefit of the doubt” with regard to intent. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost 
every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”). The court went on 
to remark that these accusations were: (1) rarely successful, (2) destroying 
attorneys’ respect for one another, (3) when unsupported, a negative 
contribution to justice. Id.; see also Ad Hoc Comm. on Rule 56 and Inequitable 
Conduct, Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, The Doctrine of Inequitable 
Conduct and the Duty of Candor in Patent Procurement: Its Current Adverse 
Impact on the Operation of the United States Patent System, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 74, 
75 (1988) (“Estimates are that inequitable conduct is raised as a defense to 
claims of patent infringement in 80% of the cases before the courts.”). 
 22. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
877 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Unenforceability may extend to other related patents, but 
not necessarily. Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable 
Conduct in Patent Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit 
Cases and a Plea for Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
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unrelated to the particular act of inequitable conduct will be 
unenforceable by virtue of their inclusion with a tainted claim 
in a patent specification. In addition, the attorney that 
prosecuted the patent faces sanction,23 and the exceptional 
nature of inequitable conduct often justifies an award of 
attorney fees when the patent is litigated.24 Of course, these 
consequences redound to the party that raises the inequitable 
conduct defense, when it is successful. It is unremarkable then 
that the charge is so frequently raised when the benefits are so 
great in relation to the simple expediency of the defense.25 
An overly strict standard, meanwhile, risks unduly 
restricting courts from pursuing the purposes that the 
inequitable conduct doctrine is meant to serve, which are: (1) to 
ensure that the PTO receives all facts relevant to a pending 
patent application, and (2) to punish inequitable conduct to 
protect the public against “fraudulent patent monopolies.”26 
                                                          
TECH. L.J. 277, 305 (1997). For example, patents bound by a terminal 
disclaimer are not affected when inequitable conduct is found with respect to a 
sister patent. Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharma., Inc. 417 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Baxter Int’l., Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“[W]here the claims are subsequently separated from those tainted by 
inequitable conduct through a divisional application, and where the issued 
claims have no relation to the omitted prior art, the patent issued from the 
divisional application will not also be unenforceable due to inequitable conduct 
committed in the parent application.”). The qualifications of the holding in 
Baxter suggest that claims tainted by a prior finding of inequitable conduct 
cannot be made clean simply by moving them from one application to another. 
Rather, it is claims that are carriers of the inequitable conduct infection. See 
Baxter, 149 F.3d at 1331. 
 23. See Edwin S. Flores & Sanford E. Warren, Inequitable Conduct, 
Fraud, and Your License to Practice Before the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 314 (2000). The 
Commissioner of the PTO has authority to regulate patent attorneys, see 35 
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D), and may impose sanctions that include reprimands (public 
and potentially private), suspensions, and exclusions, Flores & Warren, supra. 
 24. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Professor Chisum describes additional possible 
consequences such as: 
[L]iability for damages under the antitrust laws,. . . liability under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, [] liability under the federal 
securities laws, and . . . recovery of prior royalties paid to the 
patentee, [] loss of the attorney-client and work product privileges, . . . 
and disciplinary action against the attorney or agent who is 
registered to practice before the Patent and Trademark Office. 
6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[6] (1992). 
 25. Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine: Lessons from Recent 
Cases, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 719, 719 (2002). 
 26. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
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Because of the difficulty inherent in foreseeing the myriad 
ways by which patent prosecutors may attempt to subvert the 
process, as well as the myriad ways in which honest 
practitioners suffer from benign negligence, the PTO and the 
Federal Circuit continue to make adjustments to the 
inequitable conduct standard. 
2. Limitations of the Defense 
Patent rights discourage additional innovation by third 
parties in areas encompassed by a particular patent. An 
unnecessarily granted patent, whether innocently or 
scurrilously obtained, therefore comes at a high cost without a 
concomitant benefit. Not only are there high potential 
monopoly costs,27 but the public also may be forced to wait until 
the patent expires before new developments in the area are 
forthcoming. The prospect of potential monopoly pricing and an 
empty competitive field provides strong incentive for applicants 
to commit fraud. 
Patents, once granted, carry a presumption of validity. The 
inequitable conduct defense is one of the few means available 
for overturning a patent and thus aids the public in combating 
fraud. While it is an equitable defense and “serves as a shield”28 
for the alleged infringer, society benefits from that infringer’s 
                                                          
806, 818 (1945). These policies have the secondary effect of improving the 
quality of patents through the production and verification of information 
related to patentability. CHRISTOPHER A. COTROPIA, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATENT 
QUALITY 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=IPO_Annual_Meeting2&Templ
ate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15882. 
 27. Reference to patents as automatically conferring a temporary 
monopoly is not necessarily accurate; rather, patents provide a meaningful 
right to exclude. See Carl Schenck, A.G. v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786 
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Nowhere in any statute is a patent described as a 
monopoly. The patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very 
definition of ‘property.’ That the property right represented by a patent, like 
other property rights, may be used in a scheme violative of antitrust laws 
creates no ‘conflict’ between laws establishing any of those property rights and 
the antitrust laws.”). But see Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (“The patent laws . . . reward[] 
innovation with a temporary monopoly.”). Despite the conflict in the attitudes 
of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit towards the idea of patents as 
per se monopolies, one can see the logic in both positions. Patents may provide 
substantial economic power, but there cannot be a monopoly in the ordinary 
sense over a particular invention where there is no market for it. 
 28. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 
1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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wielding of the shield when an improperly granted patent is 
rendered unenforceable.29 
Yet despite its potential, the inequitable conduct defense is 
ineffective against many fraudulently obtained patents. Its 
main limitation, apparent from its title, is that it can only be 
raised by an accused infringer in a suit for infringement. The 
patentee has no need to expose himself to the danger of losing 
his monopoly where no infringement or arguable infringement 
is taking place. Fortunately, this limitation is less likely to be a 
significant bar in competitive fields where the inequitable 
conduct defense is most useful in ensuring that the public 
receives the benefit of its bargain. 
Recall that under the contract theory rationale for the 
patent system, the inequitable conduct defense is a means for 
preventing a fraud on the public.30 The more likely it is that the 
public has already been exposed to the information contained in 
a patent application, the more vigilant the system must be to 
avoid conferring duplicative benefits. Fields that are crowded 
with patents make obtaining a new patent in the field difficult 
because of an abundance of prior art.31 Applicants for patents 
are more likely in such situations to engage in inequitable 
conduct out of their desire for a patent.32 But the crowded 
                                                          
 29. In this respect, the inequitable conduct “shield” not only deflects the 
plaintiff’s attack but causes it to backfire. 
 30. Anderson, supra note 10. 
 31. If an invention has already been patented by a prior inventor, it is not 
patentable by another, later inventor. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 102(g) (2000). In 
addition, if the invention is only a meager (or “obvious”) improvement over 
what is already in the public domain through patenting, publication, or other 
public use (the prior art), the inventor is not entitled to a patent. Id. § 103. 
 32. One commentator noted that for new ventures in the pharmaceutical 
and medical device industry, 
[Y]ears of research and development, millions of dollars in costs, 
massive venture capital funding, and extensive FDA related costs 
have been expended to produce the one product around which the 
company will be entirely built. For this company, all that work and 
money must result in a patent, otherwise more mature companies will 
drive the first company out. This is very real for a “one hit wonder” 
genetic engineering company that has only one blockbuster drug and 
the entire market capitalization is based on that drug. Therefore, for 
this company, the sin qua non of its very existence is obtaining 
adequate patent protection. The desire to obtain the patent becomes 
obviously paramount. 
Shashank Upadhye, Liar Liar Pants on Fire: Towards a Narrow Construction 
for Inequitable Conduct as Applied to the Prosecution of Medical Device and 
Drug Patent Applications, 72 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 669, 676 (2004). 
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nature of the field also makes it more likely that a pertinent 
new patent will be challenged, either during an infringement 
action brought by the patentee33 or by a request for a 
declaratory judgment by another party (most likely a 
competitor).34 The competition, in other words, will do what is 
necessary to avoid ceding the field. Though pursuing its own 
interests, it acts as a private patent examiner that ensures the 
public receives “all which it has contracted to receive.”35 
Another weakness of the defense is that it is difficult to 
prove. Soon after being established, the Federal Circuit adopted 
the standard of proof for fraud announced by its predecessor, 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.).36 The 
C.C.P.A. in Norton v. Curtiss held that “proof of fraud must be 
clear and convincing . . . . [and] the one asserting misconduct 
carries a heavy burden . . . .”37 
The private nature of the inequitable conduct defense, 
most useful in a competitive field, as well as its “heavy 
burden,”38 are important to keep in mind when considering the 
standard that should apply to any subtest of the defense’s 
elements. 
3. The Patent and Trademark Office’s Administrative Efforts at 
Balancing Risks 
Inequitable conduct is a breach of the duty of candor 
toward the PTO.39 Patent examiners, seeking to guard against 
improvidently granted patents, have a difficult mandate. The 
PTO has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a claimed invention is not entitled to a patent.40 
A decreasing “number of examiners per thousand patents” are 
                                                          
 33. “A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his 
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2000). 
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000) (“[A]ny court of the United States . . . may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking [a 
declaratory judgment].”). 
 35. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 242 (1832). 
 36. Goldman, supra note 9, at 70; Kan. Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 
1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 37. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 797 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 
1457 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 40. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st 
Century: Combating the Plague, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 147, 156 (2005). 
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evaluating an increasing number of patent applications.41 The 
PTO does not have full research facilities of its own to conduct 
exhaustive searches of the prior art.42 In addition, the United 
States does not subject patent applicants to a formal opposition 
proceeding where competitors may produce relevant prior art 
in order to prevent a patent from issuing.43 Rather, the PTO 
imposes a duty of disclosure upon the applicant44 to ensure that 
known prior art is set before the examiner so that he may make 
an informed decision as to patentability.45 
The PTO sets forth the duty to disclose in 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 
(“Rule 56”), which explains the rationale of the rule and 
describes its intended scope.46 Rule 56 imposes a duty upon all 
individuals associated with a claim to disclose information 
known to them that is material to patentability.47 The duty 
“exists with respect to each pending claim until the claim is 
                                                          
 41. Id. 
 42. Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc. 439 F.2d 1369, 
1378 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 43. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 40, at 156. 
 44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a,c) (2000). 
Individuals associated with the filing or prosecution of a patent 
application within the meaning of this section [and thus subject to the 
duty to disclose information related to patentability] are: (1) Each 
inventor named in the application; (2) Each attorney or agent who 
prepares or prosecutes the application; and (3) Every other person 
who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the 
application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee 
or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the 
application. 
Id. 
 45. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 40 at 156. See Beckman Instruments, 439 
F.2d at 1379 (“[O]ur patent system could not function successfully if 
applicants were allowed to approach the Patent Office as an arm’s length 
adversary.”). 
 46. “The public interest is best served, and the most effective patent 
examination occurs when, at the time an application is being examined, the 
Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings of all information material to 
patentability.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). 
 47. Id. Once an applicant hires an attorney to prosecute a patent, the 
scope of the duty greatly expands “because the knowledge and actions of 
applicant’s attorney are chargeable to applicant.” FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co. 
835 F.2d 1411, 1415 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1987). An applicant ignorant of material 
information or its importance can nevertheless have his patent held 
unenforceable for inequitable conduct. See David Hricik, The Risks and 
Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms Prosecuting Patents for Different 
Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 331, 333 (2000). 
This could occur as a result of knowledge that his attorney happens to have as 
a result of prosecuting a prior unrelated patent for a different client. Id. 
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cancelled or withdrawn from consideration, or the application 
becomes abandoned.”48  There is no duty to disclose information 
that is not material to the patentability of any existing claim.49 
Neither is there a duty to conduct a search for prior art that 
may invalidate the applicant’s claim.50 Disclosures are 
accomplished by filing information disclosure statements with 
the PTO.51 All disclosures must include “[a] list of all patents, 
publications, applications, or other information submitted for 
consideration by the Office.”52 
In 1992, the PTO narrowed its definition of materiality in 
Rule 56. The modified rule reiterated the PTO’s admonishment 
that: 
[e]ach individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with 
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all 
information known to that individual to be material to patentability 
as defined in this section.53 
However, where the former rule defined materiality as the 
extent to which “a reasonable examiner would consider [the 
information] important in deciding whether to allow the 
application to issue as a patent,”54 the 1992 amendment opted 
for more precision. 
Under the amended Rule 56(b), the subjective standard of 
the reasonable patent examiner is subjugated to an objective 
standard.55 Rule 56(b)(1) identifies as material information 
                                                          
 48. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a–c). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Nordberg Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 82 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The 
relevant standard is “should have known.” Id. Therefore, “applicants may not 
cultivate ignorance by ‘disregard[ing] numerous warnings that material 
information or prior art may exist, merely to avoid actual knowledge of that 
information or prior art.’” Jeanne C. Curtis et al., Litigation Issues Relevant to 
Patent Prosecution—The Defense of Inequitable Conduct, in  FUNDAMENTALS 
OF PATENT PROSECUTION 2007  227, 233 (2007) (quoting FMC Corp. v. 
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 (1987)). 
 51. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.97 (2000). 
 52. Id. § 1.98. 
 53. Id. § 1.56(a). 
 54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991). Under the former standard, the information 
must nevertheless be minimally relevant to the patentability of a claim. See 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 n.2  
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“We also emphasize that the pertinent inquiry is not whether 
a reasonable examiner would want to be aware of a particular thing, but 
whether, after he was aware of it, he would ‘consider it important’ in deciding 
whether to reject one or more claims.”). 
 55. The new rule was not, however, “intended to constitute a significant 
substantive break with the previous standard.” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. 
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that contributes to establishing “a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim.”56 Rule 56(b)(2) provides an 
alternative definition ascribing materiality to information 
contrary to an argument made by the applicant in regard to a 
dispute with the PTO over the patentability of a claim.57 Both 
prongs of the standard disclaim information that is cumulative 
to information already of record in the application.58  That is, 
an applicant is not required to submit information similar to 
prior art or other facts relevant to patentability when such 
information is already before the examiner. 
4. The Federal Circuit Ultimately Decides the Scope of the 
Duty to Disclose Information Material to Patentability 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals 
from a judgment in a civil action for patent infringement.59 
Because inequitable conduct claims are limited to patent 
infringement actions, that court also has exclusive jurisdiction 
over such claims concerning the prosecution of a patent.60 
The rules promulgated by the PTO are not binding on the 
Federal Circuit,61 but that court has generally tracked the 
relatively broad scope of materiality set forth in Rule 56. The 
court “has continually rejected a ‘but for’ standard for 
materiality”62 and given deference to the version of Rule 56 
                                                          
Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Duty of 
Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pts. 1 and 10) (explaining that the amendment to section 1.56 was intended to 
clarify the lack of certainty in the previous materiality standard)). 
 56. Information is material where “[i]t establishes, by itself or in 
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a 
claim . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (2000). 
 57. Information is material if “[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, a 
position the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability 
relied on by the Office, or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.” § 
1.56(b)(2). 
 58. § 1.56(b). 
 59. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (2000). 
 60. See Cedric A. D’Hue, Disclosing an Improper Verb Tense: Are 
Scientists Knaves and Patent Attorneys Jackals Regarding the Effects of 
Inequitable Conduct?, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J.121, 124 (2006); Pro-Mold 
& Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 61. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have not decided whether the standard for materiality 
in inequitable conduct cases is governed by equitable principles or by the 
Patent Office’s rules.”). 
 62. D’Hue, supra note 60, at 125. A “but for” standard in this context 
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being applied by the PTO at the time the patent application at 
issue is being processed.63 Applications processed after 1992 
are therefore evaluated according to the more definite standard 
of materiality found in the amended Rule 56.64 
The Federal Circuit has held certain information to be per 
se material and thus subject to the disclosure requirement. 
These include, inter alia: 
(1) prior art references not known to the examiner; (2) conduct 
relevant to statutory bars; (3) documents required by the PTO, 
submitted by the applicant, including data, date of invention 
affidavit, and enablement affidavit; (4) references made immaterial 
by amendments or deletion of claims; and (5) foreign patent office 
search reports on a companion application . . . .65 
It is not necessary that information be directly associated 
with a particular claim in order for it to be material to that 
claim’s patentability. For example, the Manual of Patent 
Examiner Procedure states that “if a particular inventor has 
different applications pending in which similar subject matter 
but patently indistinct claims are present that fact must be 
disclosed to the examiner of each of the involved 
applications.”66 The Federal Circuit stated this duty through 
                                                          
would mean that only information that actually affected patentability, most 
likely the existence of prior art, would be material. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. 
Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1420–21 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In Merck, 
the plaintiff essentially argued for a “but for” test when it asserted that 
withheld prior art that did not render a patented invention obvious could not 
be material. Id. at 1420. The Federal Circuit rejected that contention and 
determined that because a reasonable examiner would consider the withheld 
prior art important in deciding whether to issue the patent, it was material. 
Id. at 1421. In other words, the information need only be within the 
reasonable examiner’s realm of consideration. Id. 
 63. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 696 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 
F.3d 1348, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & 
Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The PTO ‘standard’ is an 
appropriate starting point for any discussion of materiality . . . because that 
materiality boundary most closely aligns with how one ought to conduct 
business with the PTO.”). 
 64. This rule was in doubt as late as 2003, when the Federal Circuit in 
Dayco Products declined to decide between the old and amended Rule 56 
where, in the facts before it, the infringer had met the threshold of materiality 
under either standard. Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1364. 
 65. Anderson, supra note 10, at 856. 
 66. 2 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 2001.06(b) (8th ed. 2007). The Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure does not have the force of law but does reflect the proper orientation 
of a patent attorney toward the PTO. It strongly encourages disclosure and 
warns against assumptions regarding the examiner: 
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the lens of materiality when it earlier held in Akron Polymer 
that “[a co-pending] application was highly material to the 
prosecution of the [patent-in-suit], because it could have 
conceivably served as the basis of a double patenting 
rejection.”67 In 2003 that court further expanded the obligations 
of an applicant with regard to co-pending applications in Dayco 
Products.68 
D. A REJECTION OF SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR CLAIMS IS 
MATERIAL TO PATENTABILITY 
1. Dayco Products—A Rejection of Substantially Similar Claims 
is Material to Patentability 
In Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit favorably reviewed 
a lower court’s analysis of the materiality element of an 
inequitable conduct defense.69 Dayco, the plaintiff in an 
infringement action, had filed two families of related patent 
applications with the patent office.70 The ‘196 applications and 
the applications for the patents-in-suit were assigned to 
                                                          
Do not rely on the examiner of a particular application to be aware of 
other applications belonging to the same applicant or assignee. It is 
desirable to call such applications to the attention of the examiner 
even if there is only a question that they might be “material to 
patentability” of the application the examiner is considering. It is 
desirable to be particularly careful that prior art or other information 
in one application is cited to the examiner in other applications to 
which it would be material. Do not assume that an examiner will 
necessarily remember, when examining a particular application, 
other applications which the examiner is examining, or has examined. 
Id. § 2004(9) (internal citations omitted). The attitude reflected in the Manual 
brings to mind the real estate admonition: “when in doubt, disclose, disclose, 
disclose!” See Peter Zura, CAFC Affirms Finding of Inequitable Conduct for 
Failing to Disclose Information, PETER ZURA’S 271 PATENT BLOG, May 22, 
2007, http://271patent.blogspot.com/2007/05/cafc-affirms-finding-of-
inequitable.html (discussing McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., 
Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); see also LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Close cases should be 
resolved by disclosure, not unilaterally by the applicant.”). 
 67. Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 
1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Both applications were prosecuted before different 
examiners in the PTO by the same law firm. Id. at 1381. The district court 
found that “the responsible lawyers in [the firm] were well aware of the 
existence and details of both applications.” Id. 
 68. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 69. Id. at 1367–68. 
 70. Id. at 1361. 
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separate patent examiners.71 “The claims submitted in the ‘196 
family of applications were in some respects substantially 
identical to the claims in the patents-in-suit,”72 and “[t]he 
applications in the ‘196 family included specific references to 
members of the family of applications that issued as the 
patents-in-suit.”73 Dayco did not inform the examiner of the 
patents-in-suit of the pendancy of the ‘196 applications before 
the other examiner.74 On three separate occasions, the 
examiner assigned to the ‘196 applications rejected them on 
obvious grounds,75 but Dayco’s prosecuting attorney never 
notified the examiner of the patents-in-suit of these rejections 
nor even of the patent on which the rejection was based.76 The 
district court relied on this withholding of relevant information 
as one of three reasons for granting summary judgment to the 
defendant, rendering the patents-in-suit unenforceable.77 
Dayco appealed the judgment, arguing that the existence of 
the ‘196 application was irrelevant because, although it could 
have served as the basis of a double patenting rejection of the 
patents-in-suit, the patents-in-suit were subject to a terminal 
disclaimer.  The disclaimer limited the term of the patents-in-
suit to a period “much shorter than that of any patent that 
conceivably could have issued from the [‘196] application.”78 In 
other words, Dayco asserted that the ‘196 application did not 
affect the patent rights that Dayco eventually received for the 
patents-in-suit and that this was an appropriate test for 
inequitable conduct.79 The Federal Circuit did not reject that 
argument outright, opting instead to rely on the fact that non-
disclosure of the ‘196 application permitted Dayco to receive 
what was in effect a double patent that was not subject to a 
common ownership limitation with respect to the patents-in-
suit.80 This limitation is an additional requirement for 
overcoming a double patenting rejection by using a terminal 
disclaimer.81 Consequently, Dayco’s non-disclosure of the 
                                                          
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1365. 
 77. Id. at 1367. 
 78. Id. at 1365 (quoting Brief of Appellant). 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 1365–66. 
 81. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.321(c)(3) (2005). 
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existence of the ‘196 application to the examiner did in fact 
affect the rights of the patents-in-suit and were material.82 
Having found that the ‘196 application was relevant, the 
Federal Circuit turned to the district court’s determination that 
the existence of an outstanding rejection of substantially 
similar claims in that application was material. The court 
affirmed this ground for unenforceability, holding that where 
an examiner has issued a contrary decision after reviewing a 
claim substantially similar to claims at issue in the patents-in-
suit, that “information meets the threshold level of materiality 
under new Rule 56, in that ‘[i]t refutes, or is inconsistent with, 
a position the applicant takes in . . . [a]sserting an argument of 
patentability.’”83 The court also held that a reasonable 
examiner would be substantially likely to consider such 
information “important in deciding whether to allow an 
application to issue as a patent”; thus, it also met the standard 
for materiality under the former Rule 56.84 
In addition to the references to Rule 56, the court stated 
that “[w]ithout such a disclosure requirement ‘applicants [may] 
surreptitiously file repeated or multiple applications in an 
attempt to find a “friendly” Examiner.’”85 “Friendly” in this 
context can refer to an examiner that is unsophisticated or 
inexperienced, for patent applications and disclosures can be 
complex and subject to different interpretations by examiners 
with different technical backgrounds and experience.86 Two 
heads are better than one, the court reasoned; therefore 
knowledge of a potentially different interpretation (that 
rejected a substantially similar claim) is information that an 
examiner would consider important. Because the district court 
did not engage in an analysis of intent to deceive the PTO with 
regard to the rejection, however, the Federal Circuit remanded 
for further proceedings on that issue.87 
2. McKesson—”Substantially Similar” is not a Strict Standard 
Four years after Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit again 
                                                          
 82. Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1365-66. 
 83. Id. at 1368 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2) (2002)). 
 84. Id. at 1368. 
 85. Id. at 1367 (quoting ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, 
ANNUAL REPORT 1993-1994 (1994)). 
 86. Id. at 1368. 
 87. Id. 
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confronted the issue of a non-disclosure of the rejection of 
substantially similar claims in McKesson.88 The plaintiff 
appealed the district court’s finding that the patent-in-suit was 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct by the prosecuting 
attorney, Schumann.89 
The facts of the case that concern the rejection of claims by 
another examiner are similar to those of Dayco Products. 
Schumann simultaneously prosecuted the application that led 
to the patent-in-suit and another, similar application (the ‘149 
application).90 The invention set forth in the ‘149 application 
was “so similar” to the invention of the patent-in-suit “that 
Schumann initially disclosed the same body of art with both 
applications.”91 However, the applications were before different 
examiners.92 Twice, the examiner of the ‘149 application 
rejected the claims therein as anticipated by the prior art, but 
in neither case did Schumann disclose these rejections to the 
examiner of what became the patent-in-suit.93 
The district court relied heavily on Dayco Products in its 
analysis, restating its holding that “rejections are material if 
the rejected claims were ‘substantially similar’ to the claims 
pending . . . [within the application for the patent-in-suit].”94 
Claims 15 and 16 within the ‘149 application “substantially 
overlapped with the limitations” of a claim within the patent-
in-suit, and when those claims were rejected, that standard 
was satisfied.95 In the second rejection, there again were 
“substantially similar” claims that were rejected and those that 
were permitted in the patents-in-suit. In describing the 
similarity between the claims, the court noted that there was a 
“striking resemblance” in elements of the claims.96 For 
instance, the claims in both applications referenced a portable 
handheld terminal, a “keyboard means,” a “display means,” 
elements related to bar code readers, electromagnetic wave 
                                                          
 88. See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 89. Id. at 901, 912. 
 90. Id. at 904. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 906. 
 93. Id. at 905–06. 
 94. Id. at 910–11 (quoting slip opinion quoting Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total 
Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 95. Id. at 911 (quoting slip opinion). 
 96. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 2006 WL 1652518, 
at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006). 
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transceivers, and some form of wireless communication.97 In 
addition, there were structural similarities. They all described 
a three-node system involving a portable handheld terminal 
communicating wirelessly with base stations that are linked to 
a central computer, and they shared many important 
limitations of the communication protocol.98 In its materiality 
analysis the district court noted that Dayco Products found that 
claims were “substantially similar” when “claims submitted in 
the ‘196 family of applications were in some respects 
substantially identical . . . .”99 It then applied this sub-test to 
find the rejected ‘009 claims material to the prosecution of the 
patent-in-suit.100 
In its appeal, the petitioner argued that the “in some 
respects identical test” was a less rigorous comparison than 
was required by the Dayco Products holding; thus it failed to 
respect the differences between the claims.101 A divided Federal 
Circuit panel responded that materiality can be proven in a 
number of ways,102 and that Dayco Products is simply a 
particular example of what suffices.103 The court then diluted 
the Dayco Products holding by stating although a showing of 
substantial similarity between claims is sufficient, “rejected 
claims in a co-pending application also need not be 
                                                          
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at *17 (quoting Dayco Prod., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 
F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (emphasis in original). 
 100. Id. (“[T]he rejected ‘009 claims were ‘in some respects’ identical to the 
‘716’s Claim 1, directly implicating the materiality of the ‘009 rejections to the 
‘716 prosecution.”). 
 101. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 919 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). The McKesson court identified four differences between the 
patent-in-suit and the ‘149 application that were ignored by the district court. 
Id. at 920. The court noted that these limitations were peripheral. Id. at 921. 
Even if the district court had considered them (which the Federal Circuit did 
not concede), the similarities regarding the overall structure of the systems 
disclosed in the applications are far more important to the analysis. See id. at 
920. It was this common structure that Schumann (the patent prosecutor) 
relied upon when asserting his patentability argument. Id. Therefore, a 
rejection of that assertion vis-à-vis the ‘149 application “would have been 
considered important by any reasonable examiner” reviewing the application 
of the patent-in-suit. Id. Presumably, the court accepted the old Rule 56 
“reasonable examiner” standard in McKesson because the allegedly 
inequitable conduct occurred in 1987, prior to the 1992 amendment to the rule. 
 102. Id. at 919 (citing Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 
F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). 
 103. See id. 
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substantially similar in order to be material.”104 Thus, the 
terminology of the subtest that is used, whether “in some 
respects identical,” “substantially similar,” or “substantial 
similarity ‘in content and scope,’” is irrelevant.105 The 
important and underlying question is whether the evidence 
“clearly and convincingly proves materiality in one of the 
accepted ways.”106 The court found that the proffered 
differences between the claims in the ‘149 application and the 
patent-in-suit were insufficient to deprive the examiner’s 
rejections of materiality.107 
The Federal Circuit’s analysis in McKesson broadened its 
holding in Dayco Products by turning that holding back around 
on itself. In Dayco Products, the court held that claims needed 
to be substantially similar before a rejection of one would be 
material information with respect to the prosecution of another. 
This was so because a reasonable examiner would find such 
information helpful. In McKesson however, the court dismissed 
the requirement of substantial similarity, referring to it as 
sufficient, but not necessary. Instead, it inflated the relatively 
narrow standard of materiality (vis-à-vis claim rejections) 
established by Dayco Products to encompass whatever “would 
have been considered important by any reasonable 
examiner.”108 The extension has multiplied the anxieties of 
patent prosecutors.109 
                                                          
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 920. 
 106. Id. Courts have applied many standards of materiality since the 
Supreme Court created the inequitable conduct defense, though not all have 
been accepted by the Federal Circuit. They include (1) the objective “but for” 
test, where the patent should not have issued due to the information; (2) the 
subjective “but for” test, where the examiner would not have approved the 
application without the misrepresentation; (3) the “but it may have” test, 
where the information may have influenced the examiner; (4) the “reasonable 
examiner” test (old Rule 56); and the (5) new Rule 56 test. See Digital Control, 
Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006); 37 
C.F.R. § 1.56(a). For patent applicants, the result is that they must consider 
information under all five standards and disclose if it meets the materiality 
level for any of them; it is impossible to foresee a priori which test a court may 
decide to apply. 
 107. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 921. 
 108. Id. at 920. 
 109. See Kevin E. Noonan, Federal Circuit Increases Risk for Biotechnology 
Patent Prosecutors, PATENT DOCS, May 23, 2007, 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/05/the_federal_cir.html. 
BUSCHBACH.FINAL2 2/20/2009  11:31:26 AM 




A. THE BROAD RULE OF MCKESSON IMPOSES ADDITIONAL 
BURDENS ON PATENT PROSECUTORS WARY OF FUTURE 
LITIGATION 
With McKesson, the Federal Circuit may have unwittingly 
contributed to the plague of charges of inequitable conduct 
while simultaneously increasing the difficulty in procuring 
complex patents. 
1. The McKesson holding provides a vague standard that 
increases the uncertainty of patent validity. 
An open-ended test, variously described in McKesson as “in 
some respects identical,” “substantially similar,” or “substantial 
similarity in content and scope,” provides opportunity for 
infringement defendants to assert the inequitable conduct 
defense through creative wordsmithing. Such defendants can 
point to negligible similarities between two previously co-
pending applications and claim that these similarities make 
the applications “in some respects identical.” In like manner, 
broad similarity of subject matter between two previously co-
pending applications provides fertile ground for arguments 
regarding their “substantial similarity in content and scope.” 
For complex patents, such as those found in the biotechnology 
arena, sweeping similarity arguments will be difficult for 
opponents to rebut and for courts to evaluate.110 These 
examples demonstrate that McKesson considerably slackened 
the constraints on potential arguments that may be raised by 
infringement defendants whenever such defendants have the 
fortuity of co-pending applications by the plaintiff during the 
prosecution of its patent-in-suit. This effect contravenes the 
PTO’s and the Federal Circuit’s goal of reducing the frequency 
of inequitable conduct charges and increases the burden on the 
federal courts.111 Moreover, the unpredictability that results 
                                                          
 110. This concern is reflected in a dissent by Judge Newman from a case in 
which the Federal Circuit sustained a finding of inequitable conduct. She 
feared that “[t]he uncertainties of the processes of scientific research, the 
vagaries of the inductive method, the complexities of patent procedures, and 
the twists of hindsight, all provided grist for this pernicious mill [of 
inequitable conduct accusations].” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 
323 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting).  
 111. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. 
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from the vague and open-ended McKesson rule will likely 
attenuate business investment in innovation, with concomitant 
harms to actual invention.112 
2. The vague standard of the McKesson holding increases the 
cost of procuring complex patents. 
To avoid the possible consequences of a McKesson-based 
challenge to the enforceability of a patent, patent prosecutors 
now face a heightened burden in researching the course of 
prosecution for co-pending applications that may have 
similarities that would meet the open-ended McKesson test. In 
Dayco Products, the Federal Circuit established that applicants 
must research office actions directed toward related 
applications to determine whether the examiner had rejected 
“substantially similar” claims.113 McKesson affirmed that 
principle, and expanded the duty by expanding the meaning of 
“substantially similar” to include the rejection of any claim that 
“clearly and convincingly proves materiality in one of the 
accepted ways.”114 Because this limitation is commensurate 
with the ability of an infringement defendant to establish 
similarities between two applications, the applicant must bring 
creativity to the research process in order to anticipate 
                                                          
Cir. 1988); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021, 2023 (“The [amended Rule 
56] as promulgated will provide greater clarity and hopefully minimize the 
burden of litigation on the question of inequitable conduct before the 
Office . . . .”). Judge Newman expressed similar concern in her brief McKesson 
dissent. Focusing on what she viewed as the failure of the defendant to 
demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent, Judge Newman 
wrote, “[t]o avoid the inequity resulting from litigation-driven distortion of the 
complex procedures of patent prosecution, [clear and convincing evidence was 
required]. This court returns to the ‘plague’ of encouraging unwarranted 
charges of inequitable conduct, spawning the opportunistic litigation that here 
succeeded despite consistently contrary precedent.” McKesson, 487 F.3d at 
926–27. 
 112. See Paul M. Janicke, On the Causes of Unpredictability of Federal 
Circuit Decisions in Patent Cases, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93, 93 
(2005). Professor Janicke mentions three benefits of legal predictability in the 
patent arena. First, companies face less risk in their business decisions 
relating to patents. Id. A second reason, strongly related to the first, is that 
“[l]awyers are better enabled to advise clients on the impact of a particular 
course of action.” Id. Finally, on a societal level, “we feel a certain sense of 
added stability if we have a statutory legal system . . . [where] we can tell 
which side is ‘right under the law.’” Id. 
 113. See David Hricik, Where the Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of 
Inequitable Conduct and How to Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 
314 (2004). 
 114. McKesson, 487 F.3d at 920. 
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arguments that may be propounded in future litigation. Such 
creative research is time-consuming and expensive, 
particularly for small to mid-size firms that may not have the 
resources to create and maintain a database containing readily 
searchable details of a particular patent’s prosecution history. 
To be sure, the establishment of the Patent Application 
Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) system by the PTO can reduce 
this burden to some degree.115 PAIR provides a means for 
obtaining patent application status, including real-time status 
information for all action taken by the PTO for an application 
that is in the process of examination.116 Nevertheless, the task 
of comparing applications to one another under the broad 
rubric of “substantial similarity” still falls to the applicant. 
The McKesson rule should not affect the majority of most 
patent practitioners’ applications. Its effects will be felt 
disproportionately by those practicing in the biotechnology field 
and fields of similar high complexity. This is a result of the 
relatively larger number of divisional and continuation 
applications filed in support of biotechnology inventions as 
opposed to those filed in other technical fields.117 Divisional and 
continuation applications result in patent prosecutors having 
multiple applications simultaneously pending with the PTO.118 
This situation tends to increase the probability of having a 
substantially similar claim in a co-pending application rejected, 
thus triggering the duty to disclose under the Dayco Products 
and McKesson standards. 
However, the fact that the consequences of McKesson will 
be felt primarily by those prosecuting complex patents over a 
relatively long period of time is not an argument in its favor. 
Rather, it is an additional cost born by those already seeking 
                                                          
 115. See Noonan, supra note 109. 
 116. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, FAQ—Patent Application 
Information Retrieval (PAIR), http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/pair/pair_faq.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2008). 
 117. See Noonan, supra note 109. 
 118. A “continuation application” is a patent application filed by an 
applicant who wishes to pursue additional claims to an invention disclosed, 
but not claimed, in an earlier application that is still pending before the PTO 
and has not been abandoned. See 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2000). A “divisional 
application” may be filed where an original application contains two or more 
independent and distinct inventions, prompting the PTO to require that the 
applicant restrict his application to one of the inventions. Id. § 121. Any 
remaining inventions may be claimed in other applications that will share the 
filing date of the original invention. Id. 
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the most expensive and thus typically among the most 
economically significant patents.119 Patent prosecution costs 
are a function of, inter alia, the number of claims, the 
complexity of the application’s subject matter, and the time to 
ultimate disposition of the application.120 Highly complex 
patents involving continuation and divisional applications are 
thus among the most expensive to procure. The McKesson rule 
will increase these expenses by requiring patent prosecutors to 
investigate and bring to the attention of the examiner the 
course of prosecution of co-pending applications, provided that 
PTO activity on those applications might be material to the 
patent under examination. These added transaction costs 
resulting from McKesson are funds that could be more 
productively directed toward research and development or 
investment returns.121 
B. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY, PRIOR ART, AND A PROPOSAL FOR 
AN IMPROVED SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY FRAMEWORK 
1. There are difficulties inherent in determining substantial 
similarity. 
Determining substantial similarity is a challenge for courts 
in a number of contexts.122 Within the patent field alone, issues 
regarding similarity are found in such topics as the doctrine of 
equivalents,123 double patenting rejections,124 and obviousness 
                                                          
 119. See generally John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study of 
Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007). Economically trivial patents are 
not worth the cost of procuring them, because they provide little, if any, return 
on the investment in prosecution. See id. 
 120. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 639 n.44 (2002). 
 121. See Donald S. Chisum, supra note 22, at 317–18. Professor Chisum 
writes that the severe sanction for violating the duty of candor requirements, 
such as that found in McKesson, creates substantial incentives for patent 
prosecutors to tread carefully. Id. at 317. He notes that this incentive is not 
cost free, however, because the excessive assertion of the sanction “retard[s] 
the overall policies supporting the patent system, which include providing 
incentives for research and development and the disclosure of new 
technology.” Id. at 317–18. 
 122. See Donald F. McGahn II, Copyright Infringement of Protected 
Computer Software: An Analytical Method to Determine Substantial 
Similarity, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 88, 90–91 (1995) (discussing 
the variety of tests for substantial similarity fashioned by courts in the context 
of copyright infringement). 
 123. Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not 
literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be 
found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused 
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analysis.125 Many of the challenges parallel the criticisms of the 
McKesson rule made in this Note. For instance, a vague 
standard of similarity leads to uncertainty in the field in which 
the standard is applied. Unable to determine the proper scope 
of a patent’s (or a copyright’s) exclusionary right, competitors 
may be reluctant to invest in competing, but similar, 
technologies and arts. On the other hand, an inflexible rule 
may not sufficiently protect inventors and artists from 
competitors that are able to produce a competing product that 
appears substantially identical to the original in form and 
function.126 Thus, the choice of test for substantial similarity in 
any legal context must be carefully crafted to reflect the 
competing policies in that context. 
2. The prior art is the statutory focus of validity analysis but 
not of inequitable conduct analysis. 
The public should receive “all which it has contracted to 
receive.”127 It was for this purpose that the inequitable conduct 
defense was created.128 The invention that the prospective 
patentee brings to the government must be an advance over 
what is already known to the public. If this requirement is not 
met, the person’s application for a patent shall be denied 
according to any of the novelty or statutory bar provisions 
                                                          
product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 17 (1997) 
(citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 
(1950)). 
 124. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (granting inventors the right to “a patent”). 
Courts have fashioned a rule against granting multiple patents for the same 
or for a substantially similar invention based upon the article “a” within 35 
U.S.C. § 101, subject to certain exceptions for common ownership. See In re 
Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441–42 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 125. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“A patent may not be obtained though 
the invention is not identically disclosed or described . . . [in the written 
description] . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would 
have been obvious . . . .”). 
 126. This consideration is the policy foundation for the judicially created 
doctrine of equivalents. See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 
(1854) (“The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if the public 
are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or 
proportions.”). 
 127. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 , 242 (1832). 
 128. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 818 (1945). 
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relating to prior art found in the Patent Act.129 Because the 
validity of a patent depends primarily upon overcoming the 
relevant prior art, a court’s evaluation of the conduct of an 
applicant toward the PTO should likewise focus primarily on 
the relationship between the claims and any references that 
will defeat the patentability of those claims. The PTO appears 
to recognize this through the duty of disclosure that it imposes. 
Recall that, as revised in 1992, Rule 56 identifies as 
material, and thus subject to disclosure, information that 
contributes to establishing “a prima facie case of 
unpatentability of a claim.”130 The prior art provides the 
majority of the basis for what a reasonable examiner should 
consider useful in determining the patentability of an 
invention; it is also the most significant source of information 
that may establish a prima facie case of unpatentability of a 
claim. Indeed, it was the criticism of the reasonable examiner 
standard as excessively vague and unrelated to other, more 
fundamental concepts in patent law that led the PTO to revise 
the prior Rule 56 toward a standard of prima facie 
unpatentability.131 The revision properly shifts the focus of the 
duty of disclosure from the examiner toward the prior art.132 
In the context of an inequitable conduct analysis 
considering PTO actions on co-pending applications, such as 
that presented in Dayco Products and McKesson, the prior art 
has not been central to the Federal Circuit’s holdings. In the 
Dayco Products and McKesson holdings discussed in Part I, the 
court ignored its recent trend in materiality analysis toward 
the prior art and away from the actions of the examiner. In 
both cases, the basis for finding inequitable conduct on the part 
of the patentee was a rejection of similar claims in a co-pending 
                                                          
 129. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2000). The novelty and statutory bars, as these 
provisions are known, prevent a person from receiving a patent on inventions 
that, inter alia, are already patented, “described in printed publication,” or 
“known or used by others.” Id. 
 130. Information is material where “[i]t establishes, by itself or in 
combination with other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a 
claim . . . .” 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1). 
 131. Chisum, supra note 22, at 296. 
 132. The revised Rule 56 does not ignore the course of patent prosecution 
before the examiner, however. Section 1.56(b) retains reference to the Patent 
Office, although it does so in a manner that likewise shifts the focus to 
patentability. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(2); see also Goldman, supra note 9, at 72 
(“[I]t is clear that the courts believed that the underlying purpose of requiring 
the disclosure of material art was to enable the PTO to assess fairly the merits 
of an application against the statutory criteria for patentability.”). 
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application by an examiner. The court did not scrutinize the 
basis for the rejection of the similar claims in the co-pending 
application. It did not consider whether such rejections were 
proper in light of the prior art, and consequently, whether the 
basis of those rejections would have actually served to 
undermine the patentability of the claims in the patents-in-
suit. In other words, the materiality inquiry did not align with 
the purpose of the inequitable conduct defense, which is to give 
force to the duty of disclosure, thus increasing the likelihood 
that a granted patent will in fact be an improvement over the 
relevant prior art. The Federal Circuit should reconsider its 
approach in this arena. 
3. The Federal Circuit should include a comparison of the prior 
art shared by the co-pending applications as a means of 
screening for substantial similarity. 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence in the materiality prong of 
inequitable conduct analysis would be improved were it to focus 
not on the similarities between the claims shared by co-pending 
applications, but on a comparison of the prior art referenced 
among the applications. In this proposed revision of its current 
framework, a determination of substantial similarity between 
the claims of co-pending applications will only be found where 
there is a substantial amount of overlapping prior art that 
could be referenced against the co-pending applications. The 
proposed framework will not prevent a finding of substantial 
similarity where the applications do not share overlapping 
prior art. However, such a finding should become significantly 
less likely in the absence of such overlap. Neither will the 
revision necessitate a finding of substantial similarity where 
the applications do share overlapping prior art, though such a 
finding will be significantly more likely where such overlap is 
present. The degree to which substantial similarity is present 
will be commensurate with the proportion of prior art in 
common. 
A comparison of the common prior art will have several 
salutary effects and help to ameliorate many of the criticisms 
leveled against the Federal Circuit in this area. First, it will 
reduce the ambiguity of the open-ended McKesson holding. 
Prior art is, unlike claims, discrete and easily comparable. 
Other benefits, which are related to the decrease in ambiguity, 
are that while the proposed framework does not fully obviate 
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the need to analyze claims in all cases, it should clarify and 
ease the duties of patent prosecutors and make inequitable 
conduct litigation more predictable. 
Patent prosecutors by now know of their responsibility to 
disclose co-pending applications where the examiner has 
rejected “substantially similar” claims,133 but the difficulty 
under the current jurisprudence remains in knowing which 
applications’ claims will satisfy that test. Where prior art is the 
focus of the inquiry, a relatively simple check of other 
applications pending with the PTO will permit an applicant to 
determine the general scope of his obligations to the PTO in 
this area. It is likely that large firms prosecuting many complex 
patents, such as those in the biotechnology arena, already have 
a database application containing pending applications and 
their characteristics (including prior art disclosed in the 
information disclosure statement). In this instance, a query of 
this database for prior art in common will perform the bulk of 
the necessary research, greatly reducing the burden on patent 
prosecutors. 
A less ambiguous standard will likely lead to fewer charges 
of inequitable conduct. This consequence follows for two 
reasons. First, patent prosecutors will better understand their 
duty toward the PTO, the burden accompanying that duty will 
be lower, and thus prosecutors will be more prone to carry it 
out. Second, a focus on the prior art does not lend itself to 
interminable arguments regarding the substantial similarity of 
one claim to another. Instead, comparing the references shared 
between applications is a simple matter; this practice has the 
effect of changing the cost-benefit calculus of charging 
inequitable conduct. For where creative comparisons of claims 
that are substantially unrelated may nevertheless be accepted 
under the McKesson tests of “substantially similar in content 
and scope” or “in some respects identical,” they are less likely to 
withstand scrutiny where a comparison of the relevant prior 
art does not reveal any substantial degree of overlap. Because 
they are therefore less likely to succeed, fewer meritless 
charges of inequitable conduct will be brought as a result of 
this revision, thus providing some relief from the present 
“plague.”134 
                                                          
 133. See Hricik, supra note 113, at 311–13. 
 134. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d at 1421 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major 
patent case has become an absolute plague.”). 
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Finally, a focus on the prior art under this proposed 
revision more closely aligns inequitable conduct analysis with 
patent validity analysis. This creates consistency between those 
two areas of patent law. It also, in accordance with the revised 
Rule 56 and recent trends in the materiality determination, 
will move the Federal Circuit toward scrutinizing the relevant 
prior art as opposed to the actions of the examiner. Recall that 
a Dayco Products and McKesson-style analysis directs federal 
courts to determine whether the claims of the patent-in-suit are 
substantially similar to already rejected claims of another 
application at the time the patent-in-suit was being prosecuted. 
This question is one step removed from the question typically 
relevant for determining whether a claim is valid: “Is this claim 
a nonobvious improvement over the prior art?” A necessary 
ingredient for answering that question is the content of the 
prior art. By comparing the prior art in common, rather than 
the claims, the proposed framework is more relevant to the 
determination of whether the claims of the patent-in-suit are 
novel and nonobvious. This has the effect of ensuring that the 
alleged inequitable conduct under scrutiny was actually 
relevant to the disposition of the claims by the examiner, an 
important goal if the scope of the inequitable conduct defense is 
to be constrained. 
4. The Proposed Framework for Analysis Leads to Results 
Consistent with Dayco Products and McKesson. 
Changing the framework for analysis in this area to focus 
on the prior art would not require the Federal Circuit to 
abandon its results in Dayco Products or McKesson. In Dayco 
Products, the applications in the ‘196 family, which contained 
the rejected claims on which the inequitable conduct holding 
was based, “included specific references to members of the 
family of applications that issued as the patents-in-suit.”135 The 
overlapping prior art was the application for the patent-in-suit 
itself. According to the proposed framework, the overlap is 
substantial; it includes the whole of another application. This 
makes it highly likely that a rejection of claims in either the 
application for the patents-in-suit or the application in the ‘196 
family will be highly material to the disposition of the claims in 
                                                          
 135. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 
1361(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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the co-pending application and thus subject to the duty of 
disclosure. The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products likewise 
determined that the rejections were subject to disclosure, 
though on the basis of the substantial similarity between the 
claims.136 
McKesson leads to a similar conclusion. In that case, the 
attorney prosecuting the patents simultaneously prosecuted 
the application that led to the patent-in-suit and another, 
similar application (the ‘149 application).137 The attorney had 
“disclosed the same body of prior art with both applications.”138 
The Federal Circuit found that the proffered differences 
between the claims in the ‘149 application and the patent-in-
suit were sufficiently similar to make a rejection of claims in 
either material to the disposition of claims in the other.139 
Under the proposed framework, however, a court would not 
look primarily to the similarity between the claims; it would 
consider the prior art. Clearly, the identical set of prior art 
disclosed in both applications at issue in McKesson is 
substantially overlapping. Therefore, this method of analysis 
results in a similar result—a finding of the materiality of the 
rejection of claims in a co-pending application. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit in Dayco Products and McKesson 
established an ambiguous standard for substantial similarity 
among patent claims in inequitable conduct cases. The court’s 
jurisprudence in this area is justly criticized for increasing the 
burden on patent prosecutors, contributing to the plague of 
inequitable conduct charges, and discounting the importance of 
prior art to the evaluation of a patent’s validity. By 
incorporating a comparison of prior art among co-pending 
applications and focusing less on the similarity between claims, 
the court could clarify the duty of disclosure and attenuate 
many of these criticisms. Comparison of referenced prior art is 
a simple and discrete process, which would ease the burden on 
patent prosecutors. In addition, it will make a determination of 
the materiality of a rejected claim in a co-pending application 
                                                          
 136. Id. at 1366 (“The basis for establishing unpatentability is the potential 
double patenting rejection . . . .”). 
 137. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 904 
(Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 921. 
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clearer and more predictable, resulting in fewer charges of 
inequitable conduct. Finally, because prior art is typically 
central to a determination of patent validity, the proposed 
revision brings inequitable conduct jurisprudence in closer 
alignment with patent validity analysis. 
 
